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Abstract
Since 1980, Japan has experienced a boom-bust-recovery cycle in its level of in-
ternational financial integration that resembles the shifts in its domestic economic
activity. Accordingly, we investigate the links between international financial inte-
gration and Japanese macroeconomic performance. In addition to formal tests of the
impact of international financial integration, we explore the inter-relation between
international financial integration and the behaviour of the yen. We pay special at-
tention to the unusual behaviour of Japanese oﬃcial reserves. Finally, we seek to
evaluate the broad impact of external liberalisation on the Japanese financial system.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of international financial integration on the
Japanese economy since the major liberalisation of the capital account that occurred in
1980. In many respects, the evolution of Japan’s role in the international financial system
has mirrored developments in its domestic economy. During the 1980s, there was rapid
growth in Japanese international asset trade at the same time as the domestic equity and
real estate markets went into overdrive.1 The subsequent bursting of the domestic bubble
also saw a marked retreat from international financial markets. However, the improvement
in domestic economic performance in recent years has also been matched by a resumption
of a faster pace of international financial integration.
Accordingly, it is important to understand the linkages between the internal and ex-
ternal dimensions of Japanese economic performance. In which ways did international
financial integration act as a stabilising force for the Japanese economy? Were there ele-
ments in the nature of the growth of Japan’s external asset trade that contributed to the
domestic boom-bust cycle during the late 1980s and early 1990s? Has the deepening of in-
ternational financial integration in recent years contributed to the recovery of the Japanese
economy? In this paper, we address these questions by conducting a range of empirical
investigations that seek to identify the contribution of international financial engagement
in driving Japanese economic performance. In addition, we examine the lessons from the
research literature that has studied various dimensions of Japan’s international financial
integration in providing an overall evaluation of how financial globalisation has aﬀected
Japan.
Our analysis of quantitative measures of cross-border financial flows and investment
positions is in line with a growing recent literature that has sought to explore the empirics
of financial globalisation (see, amongst others, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002, 2003, 2004,
2007). In addition, the paper builds on related research that focuses on the open-economy
dimensions of recent Japanese economic performance (see, amongst others, McKinnon and
Ohno 1997, Svensson 2004, Ito 2005a, McKinnon 2005) and other contributions on the
Japanese current account surplus (Domeij and Floden 2006, Obstfeld 2006). It will also
draw on the rapidly-growing literature that explores the impact of financal globalisation on
1See Ito (2003a) for an insightful account of the emergence of the asset price bubble and the roles played
by the domestic financial sector and policymakers.
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trend and cyclical macroeconomic outcomes (a review is provided by Kose, Prasad, Rogoﬀ
and Wei 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief account of
the evolution of de jure and de facto elements of Japan’s integration into the international
financial system. We investigate some basic tests of the impact of international financial
integration in Section 3. Section 4 turns to the influence of the net foreign asset position
on the long-run trend value for the yen, plus the short-run interactions between changes in
the net foreign asset position and yen fluctuations. We examine the behaviour of foreign-
exchange reserves in Section 5. In Section 6, we turn to an assessment of how international
financial integration has aﬀected Japanese macroeconomic performance. Section 7 oﬀers
some final conclusions.
2 International Financial Integration
2.1 The Integration of Japan into the Global Financial System
Although Japan had gradually moved towards a more open capital account during the 1960s
and 1970s, the New Foreign Exchange Control Law that was introduced in December 1980
marks the most important turning point in liberalising international capital flows between
Japan and the rest of the world economy.2 In particular, the exchange control system
shifted from a situation in which all types of capital flows were prohibited unless explicitly
allowed to a regime in which all types of flows were permitted unless explicitly forbidden.
Accordingly, the 1980s can be taken as the key decade in transforming the relation between
Japan and the global financial system.
However, it is also important to emphasise that the capital account liberalisation was
by no means complete with the introduction of the New Foreign Exchange Control Law. In
particular, important restrictions remained on direct investment in key sectors and foreign-
exchange transactions were limited to trade-driven “real demand,” while there continued
to be restrictions on the ability of Japanese banks to undertake foreign-currency borrowing
(the domestic and cross-border inter-bank markets were quite segmented). Many of the
remaining restrictions were progressively abolished during the course of the 1980s, with
2See Fukao (1990), Takeda and Turner (1992), Bakker and Chappell (2002), Aramaki (2006) for accounts
of Japan’s approach to capital account liberalisation.
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key steps including the abolition of the requirement to link foreign exchange transactions
to trade in 1984, the establishment of the Japanese Oﬀshore Market (JOM) in 1986 and
the easing of restrictions between the JOM and domestic markets in 1989. However, cross-
border financial transactions were not fully liberalised until April 1998.
Moreover, even with progress in de jure capital account liberalisation, the limited de-
velopment of domestic financial markets and the tight regulation of the Japanese banking
sector meant that the level and nature of Japan’s international financial integration was
quite constrained in the early 1980s. Full eﬀective international financial integration re-
quired greater progress in domestic financial liberalisation, which occurred in a gradualist
fashion during the 1980s and early 1990s. These culminated in the major financial reforms
of 1998,with the introduction of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
Accordingly, the Japanese experience fits the classic archetype of undertaking dual lib-
eralisations of the capital account and the domestic financial system, with the complexity of
such major shifts encouraging a gradualist approach to reform. Moreover, the international
evidence is that the shift from a domestically-focused bank-dominated financial system to
a more open and broader financial system carries major transition risks (Mishkin 2006).
Some of these adjustment issues were highly relevant in the Japanese case (see, amongst
others, Bakker and Chapple 2002).
2.2 An Empirical Profile of the Japanese External Position
In terms of de jure financial openness, Figure 1 shows the Chinn-Ito index of capital
account openness for Japan over 1970-2005. As described by Chinn and Ito (2007), this
index aggregates across a number of dimensions of the capital account regime and shows
a progressive liberalisation path during the 1970s, with complete liberalisation mainly in
place from the mid-1980s onwards. While quite informative about the regulatory regime, a
de jure measure does not indicate the quantitative extent to which a a country engages in
cross-border financial trade and accordingly the scale of its international financial linkages.
As developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2003), a de facto volume-based mea-
sure of international financial integration is provided by the sum of foreign assets and








Figure ?? shows the growth in the IFI ratio for Japan over 1970-2006, with the aggregate
IFI ratio for the other members of the G7 also included for comparison purposes. The
pattern in the data is quite striking, with a catching-up phase during the 1980s in the wake
of de jure liberalisation, which was followed by a long pause until 2001 and only since then
has the pace of international financial integration tracked the trend for the major advanced
economies. However, as a result of the long pause, the gross level of foreign assets and
liabilities for Japan remains far behind the levels for the other major economies. This is
further illustrated in Table 1, which shows the 2006 IFI ratios for a selection of major
economies — the Japanese ratio lags the values for the other major economies and the gap
is very large vis-a-vis the major international financial centres.
We dig behind the aggregate IFI ratio in Figures 3-6 which track the evolution since
1980 of foreign assets and liabilities for each subcomponent of the international balance
sheet: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity, debt and oﬃcial reserves. Figure
3 shows the Japan has persistently maintained a net positive FDI position, with a very low
level of FDI liabilities until the late 1990s, while the trend for FDI assets has been sharply
positive. Figure 3 also indicates a major fluctuation in the level of FDI assets between the
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, with a sharp increase in the late 1980s that was nearly fully
unwound during the early 1990s.
The stocks of foreign portfolio equity assets and liabilities are displayed in Figure 4.
Japan has had a persistently negative net foreign asset position in portfolio equity, with
the gap widening since 2002 due to a near-tripling in the ratio of foreign portfolio equity
liabilities to GDP. On the other side of the balance sheet, foreign portfolio equity assets
have grown steadily from a near-zero position at the beginning of the 1980s.
We turn to foreign debt assets and liabilities in Figure 5. The dynamics in this category
are quite remarkable, with the 1980s characterised by a very rapid accumulation of foreign
debt assets and liabilities. This debt boom was followed by a major retrenchment with
both debt assets and liabilities falling during 1990-1995. Since then, the level of foreign
debt assets has grown by 50 percent relative to GDP but there has been no trend increase
in the level of foreign debt liabilities.
Finally, Figure 6 charts the level of oﬃcial reserves, which remained flat during the
1980s but which subsequently grew rapidly, with an especially large jump between 2002
and 2004. The unusually high ratio of foreign reserves to GDP at the end of the sample
period is further highlighted in Table 2, which shows that this ratio is several times higher
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for Japan than for other advanced economies.
Taken together, Figures 3-6 show that foreign reserves and private debt assets account
for the major proportion of total foreign assets, which stands in contrast to the typical
pattern whereby advanced economies are typically longer in equity assets than in debt
assets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007a). In addition, the patterns in the data show that
the evolution of international financial integration for Japan has been far from smooth.
In particular, the initial burst of cross-border investment in the 1980s was not maintained
during the early 1990s and it is only over the last several years that a pace of cross-border
financial integration has strongly picked up. In terms of the composition of the international
balance sheet, the time series behaviour of the various components has varied tremendously.
Accordingly, it is important in empirical analysis to adopt a nuanced approach that allows
for diﬀerential behaviour across the diﬀerent categories of cross-border investment.
3 Tests of International Financial Integration
We next turn to a series of basic tests of the impact of international financial integration
on various dimensions of macroeconomic behaviour. We begin with a set of indirect tests
that explore the implications of financial integration for macroeconomic variables. Next,
we examine the properties of net investment income, net capital gains and the rates of
return on foreign assets and liabilities. Finally, we turn to the cyclical behaviour of capital
flows.
3.1 Indirect Tests
There is an extensive literature that relies on indirect tests of international financial in-
tegration. Rather than directly examining cross-border financial flows, this line of work
focuses on inspecting macroeconomic outcomes and asks whether the observed macroeco-
nomic behaviour is consistent with international financial integration. Although the test
developed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) is subject to well-known limitations, it remains
a natural starting point for this approach, since a basic function of an open capital ac-
















where Feldstein and Horioka interpreted β = 1 as evidence of a closed capital account. As
emphasised by Obstfeld (1986) and a large subsequent literature, this is not necessarily true
(for example, global shocks generate positive co-movement between savings and investment
rates). Still, since a non-unitary estimate for β shows evidence of some level of international
financial flows, it is useful to be aware of whether there is evidence that investment is not
fully explained by domestic savings.
In relation to the risk-sharing function of international financial integration, a bench-
mark prediction is that, subject to some conditions, complete financial integration should
deliver perfect comovement in consumption growth rates across countries (see Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ 1996 for a presentation of the benchmark model). Under this condition, Japanese
households would only be exposed to global risk factors and would be insulated from purely
country-specific risks. In recognition that the hypothesis of complete risk sharing is un-
likely to hold, a more general consumption-based test is provided by Obstfeld (1994), who
developed the empirical specification
Cˆt = α+ βCˆWt + γNˆOt + εt (3)
where hatted variables are expressed as growth rates, Ct and CWt refer to domestic and
global consumption respectively and NOt = Yt − It − Gt denotes domestic net output,
which is GDP minus investment and government consumption. In benchmark models
of perfect financial integration, we would expect β = 1 and γ = 0 since all wealth risks
are globally shared, leading to perfectly-correlated consumption growth rates. In contrast,
financial autarky is associated with β = 0 and γ = 1 since consumption is constrained
by the domestic resource constraint. Accordingly, estimating this equation provides some
useful insights into the nature of international financial integration.
Table 3 shows the results. Column (1) shows the estimates for the Feldstein-Horioka
test. The point estimate β = 0.85 is not significantly diﬀerent from unity and indeed it
is very similar to the cross-sectional estimates obtained in the original Feldstein-Horioka
study. However, the R2 is only 0.62, suggesting that investment is not solely driven by
domestic savings behaviour and providing some role for international capital flows. Still,
the regression indicates a substantial degree of co-movement between domestic savings
and domestic investment. This is confirmed by Figure 9 which shows that both series
have moved closely together over the period. While this is not necessarily indicative of
segmentation in capital markets, it does suggest that capital account openness has not led
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to a complete de-linking of savings and investment for the Japanese economy.
Columns (2)-(4) of Table 3 report estimate for variants of equation (3). We begin in
column (2) by setting γ = 0, such that the null hypothesis is perfect international risk
sharing. The results show β = 0.68, while the null β = 1 cannot be rejected at the 1
percent level. At face value, this is consistent with a high degree of international financial
integration. However, close co-movement between domestic and global consumption growth
may also be simply driven by a common factor driving domestic and foreign net output
growth. Indeed, we turn to the alternative hypothesis in column (3) by setting β = 1.
The overall explanatory power for this regression is superior to that in column (2), while
the estimate γ = 0.64 is not significantly diﬀerent from unity. Accordingly, the data are
also consistent with a domestic resource constraint being a significant factor in explaining
domestic consumption growth, even if the R2 is far from unity, such that it is clear that
the domestic resource constraint is not absolutely binding. However, for the same reason
as outlined above, this is not conclusive about the lack of perfect international risk sharing,
since the correlation may be driven by a common global factor.
Finally, we run the full specification in column (4). Here, global consumption growth
is not significant while domestic net output is highly significant. This regression indicates
that Japanese consumption growth is not divorced from the domestic resource constraint;
at the same time, the low R2 also shows that international factors have also been influential
in determining consumption behaviour over the period. Figure 10 plots consumption and
net output for Japan – it shows that there is a strong common trend that links the two
series but also that Japan has run a persistent trade surplus, with net exports peaking
(relative to GDP) in the mid-1980s.
3.2 The Cyclicality of Returns on the External Position
Until now we have focused on tests that do not directly examine the properties of cross-
border investment positions or international capital flows. We now turn to more direct
approaches to evaluating the contribution of the international investment position. As a
first step, we examine the properties of the returns on external assets and liabilities. In
particular, we ask whether the properties of returns have been stabilising or destabilising
for Japan.
8
As a first step, we examine the cyclicality of net international investment income flows.3
International investment income relates to interest payments on debt positions, dividends
on shares and the profits accruing on foreign direct investment positions. Net international
investment income constitutes the primary diﬀerence between gross domestic product and
gross national income (GNI or, in older terminology, GNP).4 National income is stabilised
if fluctuations in GDP are oﬀets by counter-cyclical movements in net international in-
vestment income, which can occur through a decline in the investment income outflows
accruing to the foreign holders of domestic liabilities and/or an increase in the investment
income inflows earned on domestic holdings of foreign assets.







= α+ βGROWt + εt (4)
where GROW is the GDP growth rate and we expect β < 0 in the case of counter-cyclical
net international investment income flows.
However, this approach faces several limitations. A basic criticism is that the inter-
national investment position can contribute to wealth stabilisation, even if net investment
income flows are procyclical. This is possible since the primary payoﬀs on assets and
liabilities may take the form of capital gains and losses. This is especially true for mark-
to-market securities with volatile asset prices. However, for an open economy, even assets
with stable nominal values can generate capital gains and losses through the impact of
currency movements. For instance, unexpected yen appreciation generates a capital loss
on dollar-denominated assets for Japanese investors.
To address this possibility, we examine the cyclicality of net capital gains on the external







= α+ βGROWt + εt (5)
where V ALt = (NFAt−NFAt−1)−CAt captures the net capital gain on the international
investment position – it is the change in the value of the net external position over and
3See also Lane (2001) and Sorensen et al (2007).
4The other component of net international factor income is net international labour income, which
relates to the earnings of non-resident workers. However, this term is very small for most countries. Over
1997-2007, this term peaked in absolute size in 1993 at a net debit of $800 million.
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above the contribution of the current account.5
Next, we put the two components together to examine the behavior of aggregate net







= α+ βGROWt + εt (6)
where NETRETt = NETINV INCt + V ALt.
Equations (4)-(6) are subject to the criticism that the gross levels of foreign assets and
liabilities have trended upwards relative to GDP over the sample period. All else equal, this
should be associated with a positive trend in the average levels of gross investment income
flows and gross capital gains and losses on foreign assets and foreign liabilities. Moreover,
the behaviour of net investment income and net capital gains will shift in line with trend
shifts in the net foreign asset position.
Accordingly, it is also helpful to directly examine the behavior of gross rates of return
on external positions
∆Y LDit = α+ βGROWt + εt (7)
∆KGRit = α+ βGROWt + εt (8)
∆RORit = α+ βGROWt + εt (9)
where i = A, L, Y LDit = INV INCit/Xit=1, KGRit = (Xit − X it−1 − FLOWt)/Xt−1 and
RORit = Y LDit +KGRit where Xt−1 denotes the stock of the asset (liability) at the end of
period t− 1 and FLOW it is the gross capital flow in that category during period t.
Table 4 reports the results. In relation to net investment income and the valuation term
in rows (1) and (2), there is no evidence of a cyclical pattern in the annual data. This can
be explained by examining in detail the underlying returns on foreign assets and foreign
liabilities. In particular, there is evidence in row (6) that the return on foreign liabilities
is procyclical: Japan makes a higher payout on its foreign liabilities during good times and
a lower payout during downturns. In itself, this is a stabilising pattern that contributes
to international risk-sharing. The source of this pattern lies in the cyclical behaviour of
5See the appendix for more details on the contribution of valuation eﬀects to the overall evolution of
the net foreign asset position. Curcuru et al (2008) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) have highlighted
that data revisions can drive a gap between the measured V ALt and the true net capital gain. It would
be instructive to conduct a similar detailed study of the scale of measurement errors in the Japanese data.
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capital gains on foreign liabilities in row (8), while the yield on foreign liabilities is acyclical
on average.
However, as is shown in row (3), the return on foreign assets has also been pro-cyclical
during the sample period. As is the case for foreign liabilities, the cyclical component is
driven by the behaviour of capital gains in row (5). Although the return on foreign assets
is less procyclical than the return on foreign liabilities, Japan’s net creditor status means
that the return on foreign assets has a higher weight than the return on foreign liabilities
in driving net investment income and the aggregate net valuation term.
As a cross-check, we also examine lower-frequency patterns in the data. Figure 11 shows
the co-movements between the output growth rate and the return diﬀerential between
foreign assets and foreign liabilities over various sub-periods. The pattern of returns is
clearly stabilising, with a correlation between growth and the return diﬀerential of −0.88.
In particular, we observe a very negative return diﬀerential during the 1986-1989 boom
years, whereas the return diﬀerential was positive during the adverse growth period of
1990-2001. Indeed, the return diﬀerential turned negative again during 2002-2005 in tandem
with the economic recovery. However, as noted earlier, this stabilising pattern in relative
returns did not translate into an aggregate contribution to wealth diversification, since the
net creditor status of Japan meant that the return on foreign liabilities mattered less than
the return on foreign assets for the overall dynamics of the net external wealth of Japan.
3.3 The Cyclicality of International Capital Flows
In a given period, the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities are essentially predeter-
mined, since the positions reflect the past history of accumulation of assets and liabilities.
It follows that the outstanding international investment position influences the economy
through that rates of returns on these stocks. A second channel by which the international
financial system influences macroeconomic variables is through the response of capital flows
to domestic shocks.
Accordingly, we examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate net capital inflows
∆NETKAGGt = α+ βGROWt + εt (10)
where β > 0 indicates a pro-cyclical pattern in net capital inflows. If net capital inflows are
pro-cyclical, this may amplify swings in the level of economic activity and/or contribute
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to pro-cyclical behaviour in asset prices. In addition to examining aggregate net capital
inflows, we run the same specification for each subcomponent of the financial account: net
debt inflows (and the sub-elements portfolio debt and non-portfolio debt), net portfolio
equity inflows, net FDI inflows and reserve inflows.
Table 5 shows the results. Row (1) shows that aggregate net capital flows have been on
average acyclical over the sample period, with the acyclicality also characterising aggregate
net private capital inflows in row (2) and portfolio equity inflows in row (6). However, there
are cyclical patterns in other components, with portfolio debt inflows and reserve inflows
increasing during high growth phases while non-portfolio debt and FDI inflows decrease
during booms. Accordingly, there is a clear shift in the composition of capital flows over
the cycle, with faster growth associated with a decline in external reserves, an increase in
net FDI outflows and non-portfolio debt outflows, which are in part financed by an increase
in portfolio debt inflows.
Next, we expand the analysis to ask whether net capital flows co-moved in a system-
atic fashion with relative asset returns (relative stockmarket returns and the interest rate
diﬀerential)
∆NETKAGGt = α+ βGROWt + γSTKRETt + σINTDIFFt + εt (11)
If net capital inflows systematically increase when stockmarket returns are high, this is
suggestive that the pattern of capital flows may have contributed to the amplitude in equity
returns. In relation to the interest rate diﬀerential, a positive response of net capital inflows
to a positive interest rate diﬀerential may be expected but this represents a mechanism by
which the interest rate channel in an open economy is moderated by the capital flow
response.
The results are shown in Table 6. In terms of the sensitivity of capital flows to the
output growth rate, the pattern in Table 6 is broadly similar to that in Table 5, although
significance levels generally increase and aggregate net private capital inflows now signifi-
cantly decrease during upturns. In relation to asset returns, there is evidence in row (6)
that high stockmarket returns are associated with an increase in portfolio equity inflows,
while high stock returns are also associated with an increase in portfolio debt outflows in
row (4). A more positive interest rate diﬀerential is associated with an increase in the
accumulation of foreign reserves in row (3) and in the accumulation of portfolio debt net
assets in row (4), while it is associated with a decline in FDI outflows in row (7).
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Overall, the patterns in Table 6 is that shifts in asset prices are associated with changes
in the composition of capital flows. High domestic stockmarket returns are associated with
portfolio equity inflows but portfolio debt outflows, while high domestic interest rates are
associated with a reduction in FDI outflows but an increase in the accumulation of foreign
reserves and foreign portfolio debt assets.
It is also helpful to examine the lower-frequency patterns in the data, even if regressions
are not practical in view of the limited data span for multi-year averaged data. Figure 12
plots the behaviour of capital flows over 1980-2006. There are clear fluctuations in the scale
and composition of capital flows over the various sub-periods. In particular, the 1986-1989
phase was clearly exceptional. It is the only sub-period in which there are net non-portfolio
debt inflows. In addition, it is the only sub-period during which there is a net portfolio
equity outflow, while it is also the period in which the largest net outflows in portfolio
debt and FDI take place. In contrast, the early 1990s was a period of retrenchment, with
1990-1992 the only period in which the net reserve inflow and the net portfolio debt inflow
were positive, while the net FDI outflow also sharply contracted during this period.6 In
addition, non-portfolio debt was paid down during 1990-1997 through net outflows.
This general pattern can be linked to the process of progessive liberalisation of the
external capital account and the domestic financial sector. As is detailed in the narra-
tive accounts of Fukao (1990), Osugi (1990), Takeda and Turner (1992) and Bakker and
Chapple (2002), the external liberalisation in the 1980s had an asymmetric eﬀects since
the restrictions on the domestic financial sector meant that foreign investors had limited
eﬀective access to domestic assets. For instance, domestic institutional investors moved
to increase the weighting of foreign assets in their portfolios, whereas there was not much
capacity for foreign investors to acquire domestic securities during this period.
Moreover, the net non-portfolio debt inflows observed during the late 1980s reflects
regulatory arbitrage between a more liberal external regime and a still-restricted domestic
financial system. While the segmentation between domestic banks and domestic securities
firms and between diﬀerent lines of banking business remained in place, these constraints
were not eﬀective in the overseas operations of financial entities. Similarly, regulatory
guidance on the volume of lending primarily applied to domestically-sourced funds. Ac-
cordingly, Japanese firms responded by opening overseas aﬃliates – according to Osugi
(1990), the level of FDI outflows in the financial sector surged by 244 percent between April
6yen, fdi and banking.
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1986 and March 1989 and exceeded the level of FDI outflows in the manufacturing sector
during this period. This outward expansion included entry into new business lines with
Japanese banks establishing securities firms overseas and Japanese securities firms opening
foreign banking operations.
As is documented by Takeda and Turner (1992), much of the cross-border financial trade
consisted of inter-oﬃce transactions within banks and significant oﬀshore inter-banking
lending between the foreign banking aﬃliates of Japanese entities. In this way, the large
net inflow of non-portfolio debt during this period was primarily sourced from domestically-
owned overseas banking aﬃliates, as a device to get around restrictions on the volume of
domestically-sourced loans. In turn, much of funding for the overseas aﬃliates consisted
of overseas bond issues that were purchased by domestic institutional investors. Takeda
and Turner (2002) also emphasise that the the late 1980s did not see a major increase in
foreign activity in the Tokyo financial markets – the strong preference was to engage with
Japanese entities in international markets. Tokyo faced significant obstacles in developing
an international role, including relatively high taxes on financial transactions.
Accordingly, through such mechanisms, the surge in gross capital flows during the 1980s
was substantially connected to the gradualist and incomplete nature of domestic financial
reform, whereby domestic financial firms took advantage of external liberalisation to mit-
igate the impact of domestic regulatory restrictions. In turn, the retrenchment in capital
flows during the early 1990s can be linked to the emerging troubles in the domestic bank-
ing sector, which led to a withdrawal from external expansion. Moreover, the progressive
liberalisation of the domestic financial sector eliminated the rationale for much of the
round-tripping activity, such that flows naturally diminished through regulatory conver-
gence between the treatment of domestic and external financial transactions.
4 International Financial Integration and the Exchange
Rate
A central link between international financial integration and the real economy is provided
by the exchange rate. In one direction, cross-border investment may influence both the
trend and cyclical behaviour of the exchange rate. In the other direction, exchange rate
shocks are an important source of return fluctuations on foreign assets and liabilities. We
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begin by analysing the impact of the net foreign asset position on the long-run trend
behaviour of the yen and the implications of the long-run trend for the short-run dynamics
of the exchange rate. In turn, this begs the question of why Japan has been a persistent
creditor nation, with a sharp upward movement in the ratio of net foreign asset position
over time. Finally, we ask whether exchange rate shocks have been an important source
of capital gains and losses on the Japanese external position.
4.1 The Net Foreign Asset Position and the Long-Run Real Ex-
change Rate
A central feature of Japan’s engagement with the international financial system has been
the systemic accumulation of a sizeable and positive net foreign asset position. We investi-
gate the sources of this persistent creditor position later in this section but first explore the
impact of the net foreign asset position on the long-run real value of the yen. This is impor-
tant since the Japanese experience has also been characterised by trend real appreciation,
albeit with considerable fluctuations around this trend.
Although the dominant explanation of trend real exchange rate behaviour relates to
productivity diﬀerentials, there is increasing evidence that net foreign asset positions and
other factors also matter. In particular, the “transfer problem” literature postulates that
long-term creditors should experience trend real appreciation. The central mechanism is
that a long-term creditor will ultimately run persistent trade deficits that are financed
by positive net investment income inflows generated by its net creditor position. In turn,
this positive contribution to long-term domestic absorption relative to domestic production
places upward pressure on the real exchange rate. Over the last several years, there is an
increasing body of cross-country evidence showing the empirical relevance of the transfer
eﬀect (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002, 2004, Galstyan 2007 and Ricci et al 2008). As is
shown in Figure 15, Japan’s net investment income balance has grown steadily, increasing
from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1996 to 2.7 percent of GDP in 2006.
To investigate this channel, we estimate the specification
REERt = α+ βNFAYt + γRELPRODt + σ log(RPOILt)
+λRELGCONSYt + εt (12)
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where REERt is the log of the real eﬀective exchange rate, NFAYt is the ratio of net
foreign assets to GDP, RELPRODt is the ratio of productivity in the traded sector to
productivity in the nontraded sector (expressed relative to the ratio for a weighted average
of trading partners), RPOILt is the real price of oil and RELGCONSYt is the ratio of
government consumption to GDP (expressed relative to the ratio for a weighted average of
trading partners). TheRELPROD variable is included to control for the standard Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect, the real price of oil is included to control for the exogenous component
of the terms of trade, while government consumption has been found by the IMF to be
an important correlate of long-run real exchange rate behaviour through its eﬀect on the
sectoral composition of demand. This specification is quite similar to the model adopted
by the IMF in estimating equilibrium real exchange rates (Ricci et al. 2008). We consider
two measures of the real exchange rate: the CPI-based real exchange rate and one based
on relative GDP deflators. While the CPI-based real exchange rate is the most commonly
examined measure, the GDP deflator measure provides an additional perspective, since it
captures relative output prices across countries.
We estimate equation (12) by dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) over the 1980-
2005 period.7Since these are long-run estimates, the parameters capture the impact of a
shift in the long-run components of the regressors on the long-run value of the real exchange
rate. The results are reported in Table 7, with the results for the CPI-based real exchange
rate shown in column (1) and those for the GDP deflator measure in column (2). In fact,
the general pattern of results is very similar across both measures. The estimates show a
significant role for the net foreign asset position in explaining the long-run behaviour of the
yen: a 40 percentage point increase in the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP (as occurred
between 1980 and 2006) is associated with a 36 percent real appreciation of the CPI-
based real exchange rate and a 32 percent appreciation of the GDP deflator measure.8In
relation to the control variables, in line with expectations, an increase in relative sectoral
productivity measure is associated with real appreciation, as is a decline in the real price of
oil. While the relative government consumption variable is also significant, it enters with
a negative sign, the opposite of the pattern that is typically found in cross-country panel
7In line with the international evidence, these variables are characterised by unit roots but are found to
be cointegrated (the test results are not reported but are available upon request). Accordingly, the DOLS
estimator is appropriate. The Johansen cointegration estimator gave similar results.
8ext margin. corsetti et al. gal and lane.
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studies although the absolute value of the estimated coeﬃcient is also much lower than is
normally found.
We plot the fitted values of the CPI-based real exchange rate from the estimated equa-
tion (along with the actual value) in Figure 14.9 The fitted values closely match the
medium-term swings in the real exchange rate. Indeed, it is interesting that the fitted
model captures the 1993-1995 appreciation of the yen that is typically attributed to non-
fundamental factors (Backus 1998, Ito 2005a). However, there remain considerable short-
term deviations from the fitted curve.
Next, we explore the short-run dynamics of the real exchange rate by modelling the
error-correction representation
∆ log(REERt) = α− δGAPt−1 + β∆Xt + εt (13)
where GAPt−1 = REERt−1 − REERFITt−1 and Xt is the vector of regressors from the
long-run equation. We also explore an alternative specification
∆ log(REERt) = α− δGAPt−1 + β∆Xt + γZt + εt (14)
where Zt is a vector of additional potential influences on the short-run behaviour of the real
exchange rate. We include three variables: the interest-rate diﬀerential, the stockmarket
return and the change in the reserves inflow in period t.
The results are reported in Table 8. In the baseline specification and focusing on the
CPI-based real exchange rate, theGAP term in column (1) has a coeﬃcient of−0.53, which
indicates a quick reversion to the long-run trend with an estimated half-life of 1.3 years.
In terms of the other regressors, the short-run impact eﬀects of the relative productivity
variable and the real price of oil are qualitatively similar to the long-run impact. As
expected, this short-run relation between the change in the net foreign asset position and
the change in the real exchange rate is negative (which is the opposite of the long-run
eﬀect), which is the standard type of co-movement in models in which real appreciation
and current account deficits go hand in hand in the short run. Finally, the short-run
coeﬃcient for the government consumption variable is not significant.
The results for these variables are qualitatively similar in the expanded specification
in column (3). With the additional controls, the estimated coeﬃcient on the GAP term
is smaller at −0.29 which implies a longer half-life of 2.4 years. In terms of the extra
9The figure for the measure based on GDP deflators is very similar.
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regressors, the only significant variable is the stock market return – a faster pace of
stockmarket appreciation is associated with short-term real appreciation.
In summary, the evidence in this section is that the net foreign asset position is a signif-
icant driver of the long-run real value of the yen. Accordingly, Japan’s persistent creditor
status has influenced the trend behavior of relative prices, with attendant implications for
the sectoral composition of domestic output and international trade. Moreover, the long-
term factors exert a significant influence on the short-run behaviour of the real exchange
rate, via the power of the error correction term. In addition, there is also a short-run
relation between the change in the net foreign asset position and the change in the real
exchange rate, with the expected diﬀerence in sign.
4.2 Determinants of The Net Foreign Asset Position
The significance of the net foreign asset position for the trend behaviour of the Japanese
economy, through its impact on net investment income and the real exchange, begs the
question of why Japan has been such a persistent creditor. In this section, we seek to
model the drivers of the net foreign asset position.
We focus on two main potential drivers of the net foreign asset position : (a) relative
demographic structure; and (b) relative output per capita.10 11Shifts in demography op-
erate via their impact on both savings and investment trends. For instance, a projected
decline in the working-age population will be associated with higher savings and lower
10In a cross-country empirical study, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) also examined the role of public
debt in determining the level of net foreign assets, where the linkage is provided by factors that lead
to deviations from Ricardian Equivalence. In their estimates, the connection between public debt and
the external position is significant but small for advanced economies, while it is stronger for developing
countries. We experimented with adding public debt as a driver of the Japanese external position but it
was not significant. Indeed, the basic data suggest that it cannot have played an important role, in that
public debt increased strongly in parallel with the accumulation of net foreign assets - the opposite of the
pattern predicted by models that point to failure of Ricardian Equivalence.
11A recent wave of research has identified diﬀerences in the level of financial development and diﬀerences
in macroeconomic risks as factors that may explain persistent creditor and debtor positions (see, amongst
others, Willen 1997, Fogli and Perri, Mendoza et al 2006, Caballero et al 2008). In particular, countries
that have less-developed domestic financial markets and/or face greater macroeconomic risk may have
higher levels of precautionary savings and also desire to hold highly liquid portfolios. Such considerations
may be relevant for Japan, with limited domestic financial development playing some role in the 1980s,
and bursting of the bubble inducing greater precautionary behaviour in its aftermath.
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investment, as agents respond to the implications of a relative contraction in total out-
put.12 A parsimonious means to capture this eﬀect is to measure the diﬀerence between
the current working-age population and the projected future working-age population (since
demographic trends are highly predictable), where we take a thirty-year horizon. For the
net foreign asset position, what matters are relative demographic trends. Accordingly, the
demographic measure is RELPOPSHIFTt = (POP Jt /POPWt ) − (POP Jt+30/POPWt+30),
where a higher value of RELPOPSHIFT corresponds to a large future downward shift in
Japan’s share of the global working-age population.
The long-run trend in relative output per capita may influence the long-run net foreign
asset position for several reasons. According to the “stages of the balance of payments”
hypothesis, expected investment returns may be lower in a relatively-rich economy, such
that the highest-income countries are natural capital exporters. This is reinforced if savings
rates are increasing in income levels, as would be the case under Geary-Stone preferences
(Rebelo 2002). That said, much of the recent evidence has indicated an opposite pattern
with very high savings rates observed in some developing countries, most notably China.





= α+ βRELPOPSHIFTt + γRELY Ct + εt (15)
and estimate this long-run cointegration equation by DOLS.13 Table 9 shows the results.
The estimates indicate that demography is the dominant factor explaining the long-run
behaviour of the net foreign asset position, with the trend improvement in the net external
position closely aligned with the trend decline in the projected future Japanese share in
the global working-age population.
In addition, the relative level of output is also significant but with a negative sign.
While this is contrary to some of the cross-country evidence on the long-run co-movement
between relative output and the net foreign asset position, it can be rationalised to the
extent that the current level of relative output is taken as a predictor of future relative
output (Engel and Rogers 2006). Under such projections, an increase in relative output
will be associated with a decline in savings and a reduction in the rate of net foreign asset
accumulation. Although short-run factors were also important, this view is consistent with
12A prominent role for demographic factors in driving long-term capital flows has been identified in
calibrated models, such as Feroli (2003), Domeij and Floden (2006) and Ferrero (2007).
13The tests showing cointegration are omitted to conserve space but are available upon request.
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the steep decline in the Japanese current account surplus during 1986-1990 during the
high-optimism high-growth phase and its subsequent climb during the period of economic
stagnation.Figure 16 plots the actual and fitted values for the net foreign asset position. It
shows that the net foreign asset position closely tracks the fitted value, although there was
a substantial deviation during 1998-1999 at the peak of the global stockmarket boom.








= α− δGAPt−1 + β∆Xt + εt (16)
whereGAPt−1 = (NFA/GDP )t−1−(NFA/GDP )FITt−1 andXt is the vector of driving forces
for the net foreign asset position (demographic structure and relative output). The results
are shown in Table 10, which indicates a rapid convergence rate to the long-run equilibrium:
the half-life is 0.9 years. However, there is no significant short-run connection between the
annual changes in the demographic variable or the relative output variable and the annual
change in the net foreign asset position.
4.3 The Valuation Channel of Exchange Rate Movements
So far, we have focused on how the net external position influences the real exchange rate.
If the currency composition of the asset and liability sides of the international balance
sheet is asymmetric, unanticipated currency movements may generate net capital gains that
influence the dynamics of the net foreign asset position. Recently, Lane and Shambaugh
(2007) have calculated international currency exposures for a large number of countries and
developed a framework to analyze the valuation impact of currency movements. In this
part, we examine the international currency exposures embedded in the Japanese external
position.
For analytical purposes, it is useful to work with the concept of aggregate foreign cur-





it−1 − ωLit−1sLit−1 (17)
where ωAit−1 is the share of foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies, sAit−1 is the
share of foreign assets in the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities at the end of
period t− 1 and ωLit−1, sLit−1 are defined analogously. By this definition, aggregate foreign
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currency exposure captures the sensitivity of a country to a uniform currency movement
by which the home currency moves proportionally against all foreign currencies. In turn,
the net impact on the external balance sheet is given by
NETFXit = FXAGGit ∗ IFIit−1 (18)
Figure 13 plots these variables over 1991-2004. The figure shows that the aggregate
foreign currency exposure of Japan has trended upwards over the last decade: Japan is
“long” in foreign currencies, such that yen appreciation has the potential to exert a signif-
icant capital loss on foreign-currency holdings. Figure 17 plots the overall valuation eﬀect
(V AL = D(NFA) − CA) and the V ALXR variable. For Japan, the correlation is quite
high (0.87) such that currency fluctuations have been an important driver of net capital
gains for Japan over 1991-2004. Although the Lane-Shambaugh dataset does not extend
backwards to the 1980s, we can make an informal calculation of the valuation impact of cur-
rency movements during the earlier period by applying the 1990 foreign-currency weights
to the 1980s data. The biggest currency-induced valuation eﬀects were during the period of
strong yen appreciation during 1985-1986, leading to losses of 2.7 percent of GDP in 1985
and 1.2 percent of GDP in 1986. Wealth shocks of such a magnitude are unlikely to have
played much of a role in driving Japanese macroeconomic behaviour during that period.14
5 Foreign-Currency Reserves
As was shown in Figure 6, a striking feature of Japan’s international financial integration
has been the striking increase in the scale of its foreign-exchange reserves. In this section,
we seek to understand the factors driving the behaviour of Japanese external reserves.
In a recent comprehensive empirical study, Obstfeld et al (2008) propose that the level of
reserves is driven by the overall level of development in the financial sector.15 In particular,
these authors show in a cross-country panel study that the M2/GDP ratio is a robust
correlate of the level of reserves. The logic is that a high level of reserves is an important
14McKinnon (2005) argues that the wealth eﬀects from yen movements means that the exchange rate is
not a useful stabilisation tool. While this argument may greater force today, its quantitative importance
was lower during earlier decades.
15Lane and Burke (2001) also show evidence of a cross-sectional correlation between financial depth and
the level of reserves.
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component in assuring financial stability, since depositors in the domestic banking system
value the option to convert local currency into foreign currency. Accordingly, an inadequate
level of reserves can contribute to a run on the domestic banking system, if depositors fear
that savings cannot be converted into foreign currency at the prevailing exchange rate.
However, this hypothesis is at best an incomplete explanation of the behaviour of
Japanese reserves, since Figure 18 shows that the pace of reserve accumulation has far
outstripped the growth of M2. Indeed, Obstfeld et al (2008) identify Japan as an outlier
that cannot be explained by their empirical model. Figure 18 also shows a large increase
n the ratio of foreign reserves to total foreign liabilities, such that even broad forms of the
Greenspan-Guidotti rule (whereby reserves are required to cover short-term external debt
liabilities) are not helpful.
Most of the literature on Japanese reserves has focused on the role of oﬃcial intervention
in influencing the value of the yen (Ito 2007 provides a comprehensive review). This line of
work seeks to uncover the (time-varying) strategy that has guided interventions and also to
establish whether intervention has been eﬀective in moving the yen in the desired direction
and/or in reducing currency volatility. In terms of the eﬀectiveness of intervention in
influencing currency values, the evidence from both cross-country data and Japan-specific
studies is that any impact on the exchange rate is short-lived (Sarno and Taylor 2001,
Fatum and Hutchison 2003, Ito 2003, Ito 2004, Ito 2005a, Ito 2005b, Ito 2007, Fatum and
Hutchison 2005, Chaboud and Humpage 2005). Moreover, as is summarisd by Ito (2007),
interventions are more eﬀective, the larger is the scale of the intervention and coordinated
interventions have more impact than unilateral interventions.
A key finding by Ito (2004) is that the eﬀectiveness of intervention has declined over
time: the elasticity of the exchange rate to a given level of intervention in 2003-2004
was only 20 percent of the impact during 1995-2001. While a weaker eﬀect can in part be
attributed to shifts in the frequency and predictability of intervention (intervention in 2003-
2004 was much more frequent and transparent than during the 1990s), a declining level of
eﬀectiveness may also be explained by an increase in the gross magnitude of international
capital flows such that a larger volume of intervention is required to have a market impact.
An important strand in the recent literature has analysed whether the 2003-2004 “great
intervention” can be interpreted as part of the general quantitative-easing strategy that was
initiated in March 2001. Unsterilised purchases of foreign currencies are one mechanism
by which monetary aggregates can be expanded and there were several proposals to target
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the exchange rate as a mechanism to escape from deflation through a commitment to
a higher price level target (Svensson 2004, McCallum 2005). However, an exchange rate
target strategy that involves a large initial nominal depreciation faces numerous diﬃculties,
especially in terms of the negative attitude of trading partners to such a move (Mishkin and
Ito 2004, Auerbach and Obstfeld 2005). Indeed, an exchange rate target was not pursued
by the Japanese authorities.
Even if the exchange rate is not explicitly targeted as a guide to price level expectations,
currency intervention still may have a role to play in terms of a general quantitative easing
strategy.16 Taylor (2006) postulates that the great intervention in 2003-2004 was a key
element in the quantitative easing strategy that had been launched in March 2001. For the
intervention to contribute to quantitative easing, it must be the case that the yen sales by
the Ministry of Finance were not fully sterilised by the Bank of Japan.17
However, Fatum and Hutchison (2005) show that the growth in foreign exchange reserves
during 2003-2004 did not contribute to the quantitative easing during this period. In
particular, the expansion of the monetary base by the Bank of Japan began in 2001,
whereas the growth in foreign exchange reserves did not begin until 2003. Moreover, Fatum
and Hutchison (2005) show that there is no evidence that the Bank of Japan responded
to the foreign exchange interventions in 2003-2004 by expanding the monetary base: the
quantitative easing was achieved independently of the foreign exchange interventions.
At a broader level, however, Ito (2005b) suggests that the intervention strategy was
a success. Ito (2005b) identifies several motivations for Japanese currency intervention,
with intervention occurring to mitigate yen appreciation if the economy is faltering or the
financial sector is in distress, with an additional tactic of punishing speculators in order
to curb yen volatility. From a precarious position at the beginning of 2003, the Japanese
economy grew strongly during the latter half of 2003 and 2004, with an attendant recovery
in the stock market and the health of the banking system. The foreign exchange intervention
contributed to the recovery by limiting the scale of yen appreciation and smoothing out
high-frequency surges: Ito (2005b) calculates that the 35 trillion yen intervention during
16Spiegel (2001, 2006) provides succinct summaries of the quantitative easing strategy.
17Foreign exchange interventions are the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. These are automat-
ically sterilised in that interventions are funded by the issuing of yen-denominated financial bills. The
Bank of Japan would have to engage in open-market operations in parallel with an intervention for it to
be associated with an increase in the monetary base.
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2003-2004 led to a 13 percent smaller appreciation than would otherwise have been the
case. Moreover, intervention was cheap during this period, since the funding cost was low
with yen interests rate close to zero and dollar-denominated assets yielding much higher
interest payments.
We draw on the factors identified in this discussion to model the annual fluctuations
in reserve flows in Table 11. We begin in column (1) by estimating a version of the
“leaning against the wind” hypothesis where the target in this case is to moderate the
impact of shifts in private capital inflows. The results are quite strong: there is evidence
of significant negative co-movement between private capital flows and reserves, with this
simple specification having high explanatory power. By this estimate, an increase of one
percentage point in the ratio of private capital inflows to GDP is associated with a 0.62
percentage point increase in the ratio of reserve accumulation to GDP. Figure 19 further
illustrates the negative co-movement between private capital flows and oﬃcial reserves.
Much of the literature on foreign exchange intervention has focused on whether inter-
vention is more likely during periods of yen appreciation. Accordingly, we add the rate of
real exchange rate appreciation to the specification in column (2).18 At the same time, we
add the change in the M2/GDP ratio in order to formally check the performance of the
Obstfeld-Shambaugh-Taylor (OST) hypothesis in the Japanese data. The estimates in col-
umn (2) indeed support a “leaning against the wind” pattern in the co-movement between
the exchange rate and reserves — periods of yen appreciation are associated with an in-
crease in reserve accumulation. In addition, the growth in domestic financial development
is positive and significant, in line with the OST hypothesis.
We extend the specification in column (3). In Table 6 that explored the general cyclical
characteristics of all types of capital flows, it turned out that reserves growth systemati-
cally covaried with the output growth rate and the interest rate diﬀerential. Accordingly,
we include these variables in the extended specification. In addition, we wish to exam-
ine whether the 2003-2004 great intervention represented a systematic deviation from the
general behaviour of reserves — we test this by including a dummy variable QEDUM that
takes the value 1 in 2003-2004 and 0 otherwise. It turns out that the inclusion of these
18One could argue that nominal exchange rate is the appropriate variable. However, the annual changes
in nominal and real exchange rates for Japan are highly correlated. In addition, there is a high correlation
between trade-weighted indices (which we use) and the bilateral exchange rate against the US dollar, so
the choice of exchange rate measure does not make a substantial diﬀerence.
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extra variables does not aﬀect the set of results for the baseline set of variables. Among
the additional variables, the output growth rate is significantly positive - faster growth
is associated with a reserve inflow (a reduction in the level of external reserves). The
quantitative-easing dummy is not significant, nor is the interest rate diﬀerential.
Columns (4) and (5) repeat the specifications in columns (2) and (3), with the exception
that the change in the real exchange rate is separated into two components DREERFIT
and DREEROS. The former is the “warranted” change in the real exchange in period t,
as given by the fitted value from the estimated error correction equation (14). The latter
is the “overshooting” component that represents the change in the real exchange rate in
excess of the equilibrium shift DREEROS = DREER −DREERFIT . The results are
quite striking: there is “leaning against the wind” only in relation to the overshooting
component of real exchange rate movements. In relation to the other regressors, the only
change is that the financial development variable loses significance.
The overall direction of the results in Table 11 is to suggest that foreign-exchange re-
serves have been deployed to stabilise the economy in the face of swings in private capital
flows and overshooting exchange rate behaviour. To the extent that insurance is more valu-
able during bad times, the negative correlation between reserve accumulation and growth
can also be interpreted as an additional form of stabilisation. In our empirical work, we
have focused on explaining the annual reserve flow. We did investigate whether reserve
flows were also influenced by the outstanding level of reserves – if the authorities have a
long-run target for the reserves-GDP ratio then we should expect some degree of mean re-
version. However, the lagged level of reserves was never significant. This may be explained
by the fact that the sharp accumulation of reserves has been concentrated towards the end
of the sample period — in the coming years, it is possible that the level of reserves will be
run down towards some long-run equilibrium level.19
5.1 The Macroeconomic Impact of Financial Globalisation
In this section, we seek to provide an overall assessment of the impact of financial global-
isation on the Japanese economy. In the previous sections, we have already established a
19The strong growth in reserves in recent years means that it is also not feasible to fit a long-run model
for reserves to the Japanese data. To the extent that Japan is a major outlier in the OST regressions
suggests that the long-run level of reserves is substantially below the current value.
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set of important stylised facts. In particular, we have explored the cyclical behaviour of
rates of returns on foreign assets and capital flows, identified the net foreign asset position
as an important influence on the trend for the real exchange rate and established that
foreign-exchange reserves have generally been deployed in a stabilising manner. However,
our data analysis has also revealed a considerable boom-bust cycle in cross-border asset
trade, that broadly mirrors the boom-bust cycle in the domestic economy. We have also
noted that the pace of international financial integration has resumed rapid growth over
the last decade. Accordingly, our goal is to evaluate the interplay between the external
and internal boom-bust cycles, while also assessing the potential impact of the most recent
wave of financial globalisation may have on medium-term economic performance.
In the Japanese context, the intertwined and staggered liberalisations of the external
capital account and the domestic financial sector make it especially diﬃcult to provide
an overall evaluation of the role of international financial integration in the evolution of
the Japanese financial sector. During the 1980s, external liberalisation allowed Japanese
financial firms to expand overseas, thereby evading the domestic constraints on expansion
that were imposed by the segmentation of the domestic financial sector. Outward FDI
allowed these firms to learn about the operation of securities markets in major financial
centres such as London and New York at a time when the Tokyo financial markets were
under-developed. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to envisage that the development of the domestic
securities markets could have occurred without a phase of outward FDI by domestic finan-
cial institutions. The outward expansion by Japanese banks also facilitated outward FDI
by Japanese non-financial corporations. This is a common pattern by which banks follow
their customers in new international markets and either directly fund aﬃliates through
inter-oﬃce lending or act as an agent for the corporation in raising funds in the host
country’s financial system. In this way, external account liberalisation was important in
facilitating the general outward flow of FDI, even in cases where the direct financial flow
associated with the FDI may be limited.
In relation to the international activities of banks, the late 1980s also saw a significant
outward expansion by Japanese banks, both in terms of cross-border lending and outward
direct investment (Osugi 1990, Takeda and Turner 1992). However, with the benefit of
hindsight, it is clear that the quality of much of this outward investment was questionable,
with much of the expansion taking the form of low-margin lines of business that could only
be profitable if funding costs were low. Once bank capital became more expensive in the
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1990s, the Japanese banks reduced the relative scale of their international activities (Takeda
and Turner 1992). Moreover, the remaining low-margin international activities proved to
be a source of losses during the mid-1990s, especially once a Japan premium emerged in the
international inter-bank market during the 1995-1998 period (Peek and Rosengren 2001).
Accordingly, losses on these external investments contributed to the declining health of the
Japanese banking system, especially with the emergence in 1995 of a significant premium
on inter-bank loans to Japanese banks (Peek and Rosengren 2001). A similar dynamic
also applies to the behaviour of Japanese real estate companies that leveraged the high
value of their domestic land assets in the late 1980s in order to acquire overseas properties
(Komiya and Wakasugi 1991). In this way, the ultimate financial losses from the bursting
of the domestic property bubble were amplified by hubristic overseas property acquisitions.
However, in terms of its quantitative impact, the direct impact of losses on international
financial positions cannot have played a fundamental role in the domestic financial crisis,
in view of the relatively small scale of external exposures relative to the overall scale of
financial balance sheets.
That said, it is possible that the interactions between capital account liberalisation
and domestic financial deregulation may have indirectly contributed to the growth of the
bubble. For instance, capital account liberalisation allowed large domestic corporates to
raise funds on international markets, such that dedicated line-of-business banks serving the
corporate sector re-directed credit growth towards the domestic real estate sector, helping
to fuel the run up in property values (Pempel 1999). In addition, the limited development
of the domestic corporate market limited the range of investment opportunities that were
available to absorb domestic savings, such that an excessive proportion of domestic savings
were funnelled towards the property sector. By this account, the origin of the Japanese
asset bubble is in part attributable that a mis-matched and non-coordinated approach
to external and internal financial liberalisation, with the law of unintended consequences
meaning that deregulation along one dimension increased the costs of remaining distortions
in other parts of the financial system.
Indeed, it is possible to argue that a more complete embrace of financial globalisation
may have been helpful during the late 1980s. In particular, a more open domestic financial
system may have have encouraged more inward portfolio and direct investment into Japan.
By expanding the size of domestic securities markets, this may have relieved pressure on
the real estate sector as a funnel for domestic savings. Through greater entry by foreign
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banks, this may have improved the quality of lending decisions and raised productivity,
possibly avoiding some of the over-lending that occurred in the late 1980s. More generally,
Lopez and Spiegel (2006) find that foreign banks have acted as a stabilising force, with
total bank lending less volatile than domestic bank lending and foreign banks prepared to
underwrite yen-denominated bond issues during periods when the domestic banks lacked
the capital to undertake this role. Finally, the evidence in Section 3 was that the rate
of return on foreign liabilities is pro-cyclical: a greater proportion of the costs of the
slowdown would have fallen on foreign investors under a more open approach to inward
financial investment. Even in relation to the surge in outward investment in the late 1980s,
much of this failed to provide diversification. In particular, it is clear that a considerable
proportion of the cross-border flows during that period can be attributed to round-tripping
to escape domestic regulatons, such that the level of substantive foreign investment was
much lower than the recorded level.
The idea that external financial integration works best when the domestic financial sec-
tor is adequately developed has received considerable empirical support, whether from case
studies or cross-country econometric studies (see, amongst others, Mishkin 2006, Obstfeld
2007 and Kose et al 2008). Accordingly, we may expect the more recent wave of finan-
cial globalisation that has occurred in recent years to oﬀer more beneficial eﬀects for the
Japanese economy. In particular, the large-scale reform of the Japanese financial system
that was underwritten by the 1998 “big bang” set of reforms means that the nature of
international financial integration now involves a much higher level of inward investment,
especially in the financial sector (see Table 12).20 Since much of the gains to international
financial integration accrue through the pro-competitive impact of allowing foreign entry
into the domestic financial system, the potential gains may be more solid than in the earlier
phases of financial integration.
This view is supported by the international evidence, which has robustly established that
financial development is a causal factor in raising long-term productivity (see Levine 2005
for a recent survey). Accordingly, if financial integration has promoted financial develop-
ment, it may be expected to boost the long-term level of productivity and income. Indeed,
Bonfiglioli (2008) and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2008) report cross-country evidence that
financial integration boosts long-term productivity. Moreover, even if the long-term boost
to productivity is temporarily masked by the occurrence of a financial crisis in the transi-
20See Dekle (1998) and Kawai (2005) on the 1998 reforms.
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tion from a closed to an open financial system: the evidence of Ranciere et al (2008) is the
long-term gain tends to exceed the costs of short-term crises.
However, there is little direct empirical evidence available for the Japanese case. The
results of Lopez and Spiegel (2006) suggest that foreign banks have played a largely positive
role in the Japanese financial system. In relation to inward foreign portfolio investment,
Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) document a substantial increase in foreign ownership of
Japanese shares, with an increase from 5 percent in 1990 to 20 percent in 2001. These
authors conduct a firm-level study that shows that Japanese firms with a significant base
of foreign shareholders are more likely to undergo restructuring. However, these authors
emphasize that this result only applies to firms that are not too embedded in stakeholder
culture and place a high weight on the rights of outside shareholders.21 It is probably too
early to fully assess the productivity impact from the surge in inward FDI in financial and
non-financial sectors. Accordingly, the international evidence may be the best current guide
to the potential impact of recent financial globalisation on the medium-term prospects for
the Japanese economy.
6 Conclusions
Financial globalisation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that can be analysed from a wide
variety of angles. Accordingly, our approach in this paper has been to cast a wide net and
examine some of the main issues that arise in evaluating the impact of international financial
globalisation on macroeconomic performance. A key further consideration is that the period
since 1980 cannot be considered a “steady state,” with the gradual twin liberalisations of
the external account and the domestic financial sectors generating considerable transition
issues as Japan moved away from its traditional tightly-regulated financial system towards
the more liberal and open regime that characterises the current financial system.
At one level, the main long-term eﬀect of financial globalisation has been that Japan
21Indeed, the potential for outside portfolio investors to play a major role in improving domestic corporate
governance may be limited b the nature of firms that attract the interest of foreign investors. Kang and
Stulz (1997) find that foreign investors target large, manufacturing firms with good accounting performance.
Moreover, exporting firms and those that are cross-listed in the United States are more likely to be owned
by foreign investors. Since, by self-selection, these firms are likely to be already well run, the scope for a
positive contribution from the addition of foreign portfolio investors is necessarily limited.
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has steadily accumulated a large net creditor position. This may confer a potentially
large welfare gain, to the extent that Japanese national income is raised into the future by
an increasingly positive net investment income position and demographic factors make it
appropriate for Japan to have been a long-term net lender to the rest of the world. We have
highlighted that a byproduct of the net foreign asset accumulation is long-term pressure
for yen appreciation, with the long-term trend also providing an important influence on
short-term yen behaviour. We have also shown that financial integration has the potential
to oﬀer some level of risk sharing, since the rate of return earned by foreign investors in
Japan has been pro-cyclical. However, the quantitative impact of this factor was not large
during the 1980s and 1990s, due to the relatively low level of foreign liabilities until recent
years.
A striking feature of the Japanese external balance sheet has been the growth in its
level of external reserves since the early 1990s, with a strong surge during 2003-2004. This
characteristic is atypical in comparison to other advanced economies and is more similar to
the recent behaviour of other East Asian economies. We have shown that the dynamics of
reserve accumulation has been largely targeted at oﬀsetting swings in private capital flows
and overshooting in the exchange rate. However, we may project that improved domestic
economic performance will allow the Japanese authorities to decumulate reserves, especially
if the health of the domestic banking sector continues to improve.
In view of the boom-bust cycle in international financial integration during the 1980s
and 1990s, it is diﬃcult to establish the overall impact of international financial integration
on long-term Japanese economic performance. However, we have argued that the nature
of financial globalisation in recent years should be more beneficial than in previous phases,
especially with the greater openness and improved health of the domestic financial sector.
Accordingly, we expect the question to be an important item on the research agenda in the
years to come.
Appendix: Accounting Decomposition
It is important to understand current account behaviour in the context of the overall
evolution of the net foreign asset position (NFA). As has been emphasised by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2004a, 2005a), capital gains and losses (i.e. valuation changes) on
accumulated holdings of foreign assets and liabilities can swamp current account flows.
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Moreover, such valuation eﬀects are growing in importance over time, in line with the
spectacular increase in the gross scale of the international balance sheet (the ratios of
foreign assets and liabilities to GDP have grown sharply in the last 15 years).
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a), the change in the net foreign asset position
can be written as
Bt −Bt−1 = CAt +KGt +Et (19)
where Bt is the net foreign asset position, CAt is the current account balance, KGt
is the capital gain or loss on net foreign assets (equal to the change in stocks minus the
underlying flows) and the term Et includes factors such as capital account transfers (the
so-called capital account balance) and errors and omissions that drive a wedge between
a country’s current account and net inflows of capital. In turn, the current account CAt
equals the sum of the balance on goods, services, and current transfers BGSTt and the
investment income balance Y LDt = iAt At−1 − iLt Lt−1, where A and L are external assets
and liabilities, respectively, and iAt , iLt are the nominal yields on these assets and liabilities.
Indicating ratios to GDP with lower-case letters, we can express equation (19) as fol-
lows
bt − bt−1 = bgstt +





− gt + πt
(1 + gt)(1 + πt)
bt−1 + εt (20)
where gt is the growth rate of real GDP, πt is the inflation rate, and the term εt includes
the ratio of capital transfers and errors and omissions to GDP. The second and third term
on the right-hand-side of equation (2) captures the eﬀect of nominal returns on external
assets and liabilities on the evolution of the external position. To see this more clearly,
define kgAt (kgLt ) as the ratio of the capital gain on external assets (liabilities), measured in
domestic currency, to the outstanding stock of external assets (liabilities) at the beginning
of the period, so that KGt = kgAt At−1 − kgLt Lt−1. Then the gross real rate of return on
foreign assets, measured in domestic currency, will equal 1 + rAt = (1 + it + kgAt )/(1 + πt),
and an analogous definition will hold for the rate of return on foreign liabilities 1 + rLt .
Using these definitions, we can derive






at−1 + εt (21)
This framework delivers several important insights. First, all else equal, a trade surplus
improves the net external position. Second, there is a standard term to capture the impact
of the gap between the rate of return on liabilities and the output growth rate, as is familiar
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from traditional analysis of debt dynamics. Third, when rates of return on external assets
and liabilities diﬀer, the gross scale of external assets and liabilities matters in addition to
the net position, as is shown by the third term on the rightside of equation (21).
Equation (21) in the text can also be written as




(rAt − rWt )
1 + gt
at−1 −
(rLt − rWt )
1 + gt
lt−1 + εt (22)
where rWt is the ‘global’ (or average) rate of return. Equation (22) highlights that global
fluctuations in returns aﬀect the net external position to the extent that a country is a
creditor or debtor: an increase in the ‘global’ rate of return improves the net foreign asset
position of a creditor but is adverse for a debtor.
In addition, ‘asymmetric’ return shocks - the deviations of returns on foreign assets and
liabilities from the global return - is proportional to the gross scale of foreign assets and
liabilities relative to GDP. The propensity for deviations from the global (average) rate of
return depends on an array of factors. Among the most important are the external capital
structure of a country - the split between equity and debt on each side of the international
balance sheet - and the currency composition of external assets and liabilities.
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IFI = (FA+FL)/GDP . Source: Author’s calculations, based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007).
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Foreign-exchange reserves, expressed as ratios to GDP. Source: Author’s calculations based
on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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Table 3: Tests of International Financial Integration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ IY Cˆ Cˆ Cˆ
α -0.25 0.002 0.01 0.01







p(coeff. = 1) 0.19 0.03 0.04 0.07/0.03
Adj.R2 0.62 0.26 0.39 0.36
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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Table 4: Cyclical Behaviour of External Returns
α GROW Adj.R2 DW
(1) D(Net Investment Income) 0.13 0.015 0.04 2.03
(2.7)** (1.1)
(2) D(Valuation Term) -0.81 0.24 0.25 2.15
(1.5) (1.55)
(3) D(Return on Foreign Assets) 0.3 2.65 0.19 2.28
(.2) (2.16)**
(4) D(Yield on Foreign Assets) 3.8 -0.06 0.35 1.7
(12.4)*** (.55)
(5) D(Capital Gain on Foreign Assets) -4.3 2.13 0.13 2.23
(2.1)** (1.73)*
(6) D(Return on Foreign Liabilities) -0.64 3.55 0.21 2.27
(.24) (2.27)**
(7) D(Yield on Foreign Liabilities) 2.3 -0.1 0.58 2.03
(7.5)*** (0.9)
(8) D(Capital Gain on Foreign Liabilities) -4.4 2.9 0.15 2.24
(1.5) (1.84)*
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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Table 5: Cyclical Behaviour of Capital Flows
α GROW Adj.R2 DW
(1) D(Net Capital Inflows) -0.27 0.014 -0.04 1.71
(1.4) (.21)
(2) D(Net Private Capital Inflows) 0.18 -0.14 -0.01 2.01
(.57) (1.6)
(3) D(Reserves Inflow) -0.37 0.15 0.03 2.16
(1.59) (2.75)**
(5) D(Portfolio Debt Inflow) -0.55 0.26 0.04 2.93
(2.1)** (2.33)**
(6) D(Non-Portfolio Debt Inflow) 0.53 -0.33 0.08 1.8
(1.56) (3.07)***
(7) D(Portfolio Equity Inflow) -0.1 0.04 -0.04 3.1
(.3) (.33)
(8) D(FDI Inflow) 0.07 -0.045 0.06 1.5
(1.2) (2.62)**
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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Table 6: Capital Flows, Growth and Financial Markets
α GROW STKRET INTDIFF Adj.R2 DW
(1) D(Net Capital Inflows) -0.16 0.005 0.17 0.03 -0.12 1.71
(.57) (.07) (.33) (.43)
(2) D(Net Private Capital Inflows) 0.65 -0.19 1.05 0.18 -0.02 2.05
(1.4) (1.95)* (.87) (1.57)
(3) D(Reserves Inflow) -0.81 0.2 -0.88 -0.14 0.05 2.25
(2.51)** (3.29)*** (.86) (1.93)*
(4) D(Portfolio Debt Inflow) -1.3 0.36 -2.96 -0.26 0.2 2.97
(3.2)*** (3.7)*** (4.83)*** (2.45)**
(5) D(Non-Portfolio Debt Inflow) 1.24 -0.4 1.84 0.23 0.12 1.9
(2.51)** (5.1)*** (1.5) (1.6)
(6) D(Portfolio Equity Inflow) 0.18 -0.02 2.31 0.11 0.09 2.72
(.3) (.18) (2.01)* (.9)
(8) D(FDI Inflow) 0.29 -0.06 -0.09 0.06 0.28 2.02
(2.41)** (3.1)*** (.36) (2.44)**
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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Relative Productivity 2.03 2.07
(3.7)*** (4.01)***
Oil price -0.44 -0.48
(16.3)*** (19.4)***
Relative Government Consumption -1.05 -1.15
(4.3)*** (4.8)***
Adj.R2 0.62 0.64
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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Relative Productivity 0.74 0.79
(2.7)** (2.8)**
Oil price -0.23 -0.25
(2.2)** (2.3)**
Relative Government Consumption -0.31 -0.44
(.39) (.5)
Adj.R2 0.5 0.5
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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Table 11: Correlates of Foreign Exchange Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
α -0.1 -0.23 -0.4 -0.18 -0.43
(.86) (1.99)* (2.4)** (.94) (1.86)*
PFLOW -0.62 -0.61 -0.58 -0.65 -0.6
(4.5)*** (4.1)*** (3.69)*** (4.56)*** (3.83)***
DREER -2.12 -2.1
(2.02)* (2.55)**
D(M2Y) 0.06 0.06 0.066 0.06











R2 0.68 0.71 0.7 0.75 0.73
DW 1.77 1.52 1.67 1.75 1.89
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. t-statistics based
on Newey-West standard errors.
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Table 12: FDI Transactions in the Financial Sector
Inward Outward
Cases Value Cases Value
1989 40 235 316 20,424
1990 64 159 233 11,802
1991 27 1,203 167 6,813
1992 16 190 194 5,962
1993 19 40 190 7,265
1994 44 687 153 6,872
1995 63 1,001 123 5,272
1996 50 273 113 8,760
1997 86 1,616 171 14,688
1998 200 4,569 317 21,000
1999 208 5,115 432 11,029
2000 300 10,293 679 9,341
2001 359 6,608 791 13,455
2002 400 6,468 1,097 15,604
2003 473 10,179 1,329 8,634
2004 626 29,767 1,579 12,483
Note: Data are from Japanese Ministry of Finance. Value of deals in units of 100 million
Yen.
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